

# **CYBERSECURITY COMPLIANCE: REQUIREMENTS & OPTIONS**

**DFARS 204.73**

**DFARS 239.76**

**FAR 4.19**





**NIST (SP) 800-53 & 800-171**

**Michael G. Semmens**

**Imprimis, Inc.**

**June 2017**

# AGENDA

-  The Nature of Cyber Threats
-  Compliance Requirements
-  Approaches and Available Resources
-  Summary

# THE NATURE OF CYBER THREATS

Threats by Domain

Defense Requirements

# THE TWO SIDES OF CYBER



**Productive  
Applications**  
via the Cyber Domain



**Threats**  
via the Cyber  
Domain

# PRODUCTIVE APPLICATIONS



**Productive Applications**  
via the Cyber Domain

- 🏆 Advanced Manufacturing
- 🏆 Smart Grid – Smart Energy
- 🏆 Digital Healthcare
- 🏆 Transportation
- 🏆 Space
- 🏆 ... and Many, Many More

**In Cyber Shangri-La, the full potential of technology on global GDP is realized as cyber security one-ups the bad guys for a net global gain of \$190 trillion. The worst-case scenario, where the bad guys win - Clockwork Orange Internet - drains \$90 trillion of potential net economic benefit from global GDP.“**  
**[By 2030] [Zurich Insurance Group]**



# CYBER THREATS



**Threats**  
via the Cyber  
Domain



**The loss of industrial information and intellectual property through cyber espionage constitutes the "greatest transfer of wealth in history,"**

**[General Keith Alexander, NSA Director 2012]**

# HAS ANYONE HEARD OF A CYBER INCIDENT LATELY?

Doug Olenick, "Cyber Enemies", *SCMagazine*, May 2017: 15-17. Print.

## Top 3 Chinese Hacks

1. OPM – Office of Personnel Management
2. FDIC
3. Various Industrial Espionage

## Top 3 Russian Hacks

1. 2016 Presidential Election
2. Democratic National Committee
3. Yahoo!

*Hey, wait a minute – that ain't nothing – how about ...*

- **The F-35**
- **Technology Targeting**

- **Estonia 2007**
- **Georgia 2008**
- **Ukraine &**
- **Ukraine Power 2015**
- **(BTW – no one hacked the election)**

## Top 3 North Korean Hacks

1. Sony Entertainment
2. SWIFT
3. Interpark

## Top 3 Criminal Hacks

1. Home Depot
2. Anthem 2015
3. Mirai (**Dyn 2016**)

## Top 3 Terrorist Hacks

1. CENTCOM Twitter
2. Newsweek Twitter
3. Islamic State Hacking of Division's (ISHD) Kill List (a.k.a., Cyber Caliphate, Islamic Cyber Army or ICA)

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# CYBER THREAT PLAYERS AND ACTIVITIES


	<b>APT</b> (Advanced Persistent Threat)	<b>CYBER CRIME</b>	<b>HACKTAVIST</b>	<b>INSIDER THREAT</b>	<b>TERRORIST</b>	<b>NUISANCE</b>
<b>ACTORS</b>	Nation States, Major Crime Org's	Amateurs to Nations	Amateurs to Major Org's	Authorized User / Admin.	Individual, Non-State, Nation State	Unskilled or Less Able Actors
<b>OBJECTIVE</b>	Espionage, Dis-Enable, Destroy, Defeat	Theft of Valued Data	Discredit, Disrupt, Cause Havoc	Sensitive Information, Revenge, Profit	Disrupt, Destroy, Kill	Financial, Recognition
<b>TTP:</b> TECHNIQUES TACTICS PROCEDURES	Social Eng., Phishing, Advanced TTPs, Implant 'Low & Slow'	Social Eng., Phishing, Escalate Privileges, Exfil. Data	Social Eng., Phishing, DOS/DDOS (Distributed Denial of Service)	Use Authorized Access to Steal, Sabotage, Damage	Social Eng. To Advanced TTP	SPAM, Scanning, Crawlers, Worms, Viruses
<b>MAJOR KNOWN SOURCES</b>	China, Russia, Iran, North Korea	Russia, China, "Riders of the Dark Net"	Political, Ethnical, Religious Org's or Individuals	Throughout	North Korea, Al Qaeda, ISIS /ISIL, ... many	Ubiquitous



# E-Mail Attack Vector

Ref: Verizon DBIR 2016 Report

**77.3%**  
**Of Successful Attacks**



## *Email Phishing*

A form of social engineering in which a message, typically an email, with a malicious attachment or link is sent to a victim with the intent of tricking the recipient to open an attachment or following a link

Number of phishing emails opened and clicked in first 24 hours and percent of opened emails that were clicked

# WHY SHOULD ALL COMPANIES CARE?

 *“Hey, I’m just a small business. No one cares enough about what we do to bother with a cyber attack. What would they get?”*



- ✎ PII (Personally Identifiable Information)
- ✎ PHI (Protected Health Information)
- ✎ IP (Intellectual Property)
- ✎ Money
- ✎ Spectrum of Sensitive Information, and ...
- ✎ Your Cyber Vector Radius™ (CVR™)

# ABOUT YOUR VECTOR RADIUS

**VECTOR:** In physics and geometry, a vector is used to represent physical quantities that have both magnitude and direction

**RADIUS:** A straight line from the center to the circumference

**ATTACK VECTOR:** the particular approach used, or vulnerability exploited, in order to penetrate a computer system's security or propagate malicious software



- There are no PHYSICAL dimensions in cyberspace – a computer in Beijing or Moscow is as close to you as your officemate's computer.
- The concepts of space and separation are gone.
- The (attackers) are bad guys in your offices and your homes.

# SUMMARY

- 🌐 The quality of life and the economic performance of the US and the world can be greatly enhanced by the appropriate application of cyber related technology
- 🌐 The ubiquitous nature of cyber technology combined with the open culture of our “cyber community” present such a huge vulnerability to enemies and criminals alike that it could – if unchecked – diminish the US in the extreme

# BEST PRACTICES & RECOMMENDATIONS

21 June  
2017



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13


# EXECUTIVE RESPONSIBILITY

- 🕒 Cybersecurity and Compliance programs are needed within a Corporation for the purpose of...
  - ❖ Managing Risk and Liabilities
  - ❖ Meeting Minimum Requirements to Access Markets
  - ❖ Achieving and Maintaining Competitive Advantage

## Cybersecurity is a Fiduciary Responsibility of the Organization's




- Board of Directors,
- Officers,
- Senior Leadership and Management

# COMPONENTS OF CYBERSECURITY






# THE SMART CYBER CITIZEN™





## Protect Credentials

-  Password (Complexity & Change\_)
-  Password Manager
-  Do not use important passwords in public places

## Protect Hardware

-  Firewall
-  Antivirus / End Point Protection
-  Patching & Updating

## Protect Data

-  Classify Data
-  Backup (on & off line)
-  Encrypt key data when & if you can
-  Basic physical security

### **USE WHAT YOU KNOW TO STAY SAFE:**

1. Do not accept e-mails from people you do not know
2. Do not download an attachment or click a link unless you are **ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN** it from or to a safe source
3. If you receive an odd e-mail from someone you do know – verify it with them – watch out for Cyber Posers
4. If you delete an important e-mail it can be re-sent with little effort– if you respond to a bad e-mail data or money is gone forever – and your job may be too!



# THE CYBER BIG 10 FOR ORGANIZATIONS

- 🏆 Control Access
- 🏆 Control Configuration: Inventory & Control Devices and Programs
- 🏆 Segment Networks
- 🏆 Classify Data & Encrypt Liberally
- 🏆 Develop a Cybersecurity Architecture That Employs Both Strong Perimeter & Active (Defenses in Depth)
  - ✂ Firewall, Anti-Virus, Intrusion Detection/Prevention
- 🏆 Scan Periodically – Scan Regularly
- 🏆 Train & Test ALL Staff, and then Train Them Again
- 🏆 Develop, Implement, Train, Test and Exercise Your
  - ✂ Incident Response Plan
  - ✂ Business Continuity Plan (**All Backups**)
- 🏆 Improve Each and All Areas Continuously
- 🏆 Be a Member of an Organization(s) That Can Provide Cyber Threat Intelligence, Alerts, Exercises, Training, and Resources

# BEST PRACTICES LEAD TO STANDARDS

- ✔ The Big 10 look a lot like the security families in NIST 800-171
- ✔ Cyber Standards are the consensus best practices for cybersecurity
- ✔ Adopting a standard is a best practice for any organization
- ✔ The best thing for an organization to do is get started – you will find it is not that hard and the benefits are significant
- ✔ ... Besides, if you do contract work for the U.S. Government you are going to have to comply with NIST 800-171 or stop working for the USG

# DFARS

## (Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement)

### **204.73 (subpart) Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and Cyber Incident Reporting**

252.204-7012 Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and Cyber Incident Reporting

252.204-7008 Compliance with Safeguarding Covered Defense Information Controls

252.204-7009 Limitations on the Use or Disclosure of Third-Party Contractor Reported Cyber Incident Information

### **202.1 (subpart) Definitions**

### **239.76 (subpart) Cloud Computing**

252.239-7009 Representation of Use of Cloud Computing


252.239-7010 Cloud Computing Services

### **212.301 (f) (clauses & provisions) Solicitation provisions and contract clauses for the acquisition of commercial items**

# GOVERNMENT PRESENTATION (DPAP)

## Navigating Unclassified Cyber/Information (System) Security Protections

Elements that drive appropriate protections. The information system and the information



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<b>SUBPART / CLAUSE</b>	<b>TITLE</b>	<b>REQUIREMENTS</b>
<b>204.73</b> (subpart)	<b>Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and Cyber Incident Reporting.</b> <i>Revised – Oct 21, 2016</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Contractors &amp; Subcontractors must safeguard ‘Covered’ defense information that resides in or transits through contractor ‘UNCLASSIFIED’ information system.</li> <li>▪ For Contractor Systems, FedRAMP qualified cloud providers will be used</li> <li>▪ Must rapidly report incidents involving possible loss of covered data to DoD via Dibnet.dod.mil</li> <li>▪ Report will include i) incident report, ii) malicious software, and iii) media</li> <li>▪ Prescribes: 252.204-7008, -7009, -7012 , 252.227-7013</li> </ul>
<b>202.1</b> (subpart)	<b>Definitions.</b> <i>Revised - Oct 21, 2016</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Designated subpart as location for definitions:</li> </ul>
<b>239.76</b> (subpart)	<b>Cloud Computing.</b> <i>New Addition – Aug 26, 2015</i> <i>Revised - Oct 21, 2016</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ For Federal Systems, contracts will be awarded to cloud service providers that are granted provisional authorization by DISA using DISA SRG.</li> <li>▪ Prescribes 252.239-7009 &amp; -7010</li> </ul>
<b>212.301 (f)</b> (clauses & provisions)	<b>Solicitation provisions and contract clauses for the acquisition of commercial items.</b> <i>Revised – August 2, 2016</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Identifies Solicitation clauses and provisions to be included in the acquisition of commercial items.</li> <li>▪ Includes cybersecurity and safeguards identified in the above clauses.</li> <li>▪ Supply chain risk evaluation required (239.73)</li> </ul>

SUBPART / CLAUSE	TITLE	REQUIREMENTS
204.73 (subpart)	Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and Cyber Incident Reporting. <i>Revised – Oct 21, 2016</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Contractors &amp; Subcontractors must safeguard ‘Covered’ defense information that resides in /through contractor ‘UNCLASSIFIED’ information system.</li> <li>▪ Must rapidly report incidents ... to DoD via <a href="http://www.dibnet.dod.mi">www.dibnet.dod.mi</a></li> <li>▪ Report will include i) incident report, ii) malicious software, and iii) media</li> <li>▪ Prescribes: 252.204-7008, -7009, -7012</li> </ul>
252.204-7012 (clause)	Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and Cyber Incident Reporting. <i>Revised – Sept 21, 2015</i> <i>Revise - Dec 30, 2015</i> <i>Revised Oct 21, 2016</i>	<p><i>(a) Definitions. [Please see Table of Definitions]</i></p> <p><i>(b) Adequate security.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Contractor will implement information systems security protections on all covered contractor ‘UNCLASSIFIED’ information systems</li> <li>▪ If operated on <b>behalf of the Government</b> – for Cloud follow <b>DFARS 252.239-7010</b>,</li> <li>▪ Contractor (Offeror) <b>represents that it will implement security requirements in NIST 800-171 as soon as practical but no later than December 31, 2017</b></li> <li>▪ For all contracts awarded <b>prior to October 1, 2017</b>, the contractor shall <b>notify the DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO)</b>, via email at <a href="mailto:osd.dibcsia@mail.mil">osd.dibcsia@mail.mil</a> within <b>30 days</b> of contract award</li> <li>▪ Contractor will <b>apply other information system security measures</b> when the contractor reasonably determines that additional security measures are required.</li> <li>▪ “Alternative but equal effective” security measures ... submitted in writing to an “authorized representative of the DoD CIO,” who will “adjudicate” offeror requests.</li> <li>▪ If Contractor intends to use an <b>external cloud service provider</b> ... security requirements ... for the <b>Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) <u>Moderate</u> baseline</b></li> </ul> <p><i>(c) Cyber incident reporting requirement.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Contractor will <b>rapidly report incidents within 72 hours</b> to ... prime contractor and DoD via <a href="http://dibnet.dod.mil">http://dibnet.dod.mil</a></li> <li>▪ Medium Assurance Certificate required</li> </ul>

SUBPART / CLAUSE	TITLE	REQUIREMENTS
<b>204.73</b> (subpart)	<b>Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and Cyber Incident Reporting.</b> <i>Revised – Oct 21, 2016 Continued</i>	
<b>252.204-7012</b> (Continued)	<b>Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and Cyber Incident Reporting.</b> <i>Revised – Sept 21, 2015</i> <i>Revise - Dec 30, 2015</i>	<p><i>(d) Malicious software.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ When Contractor discover and <b>isolate malicious software</b> submit the malicious software to <b>DoD Cyber Crime Center (DC3)</b>-not the Contracting Officer.</li> </ul> <p><i>(e) Media preservation &amp; protection.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ When a cyber incident has occurred, the Contractor shall <b>preserve and protect images</b> of all known affected information systems and all relevant monitoring/packet capture data for at <b>least 90 days</b></li> </ul> <p><i>(f) Access to additional information or equipment necessary for forensic analysis.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Upon request, Contractor will <b>provide access to additional data and equipment for forensics</b></li> </ul> <p><i>(g) Cyber incident damage assessment activities.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ If requested, Contractor will <b>provide all damage assessment information.</b></li> </ul> <p><i>(h) - (k) DoD safeguarding and use of contractor attributional/proprietary information.</i></p> <p><i>(l) Other safeguarding or reporting requirements.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The safeguarding and cyber incident reporting required by this clause in no way abrogates the Contractor’s responsibility for other safeguarding</li> </ul> <p><i>(m) Subcontracts.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Contractor will <b>include this clause on any subcontracts</b>, or similar contractual instruments, for which subcontractor performance will involve covered defense information ... including reporting.</li> <li>▪ The Contractor shall— <b>Require subcontractors to—</b> (i) <b>Notify the prime Contractor</b> (or next higher-tier subcontractor) when submitting a <b>request to vary from a NIST SP 800-171</b>; and (ii) Provide the <b>incident report number</b>, automatically assigned by DoD, to the prime Contractor (or next higher-tier subcontractor) as soon as practicable, <b>when reporting a cyber incident to DoD</b> as required in paragraph (c) of this clause.</li> </ul>



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<b>SUBPART / CLAUSE</b>	<b>TITLE</b>	<b>REQUIREMENTS</b>
<b>204.73</b> (subpart)	<b>Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and Cyber Incident Reporting.</b> <i>Revised – Sept 21, 2015</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Contractors &amp; Subcontractors must safeguard ‘<b>Covered</b>’ defense information that resides in or transits through contractor (IT) system.</li> <li>▪ Must submit to DoD i) incident report, ii) malicious software, and iii) media.</li> <li>▪ Prescribes: 252.204-7008, -7009, -7012</li> </ul>
<b>252.204-7008</b> (provision)	<b>Compliance with Safeguarding Covered Defense Information Controls.</b> <i>New Addition - Aug 26, 2015</i> <i>Revised - Dec 30, 2015</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>All contractors represent to implement NIST 800-171 as soon as practical, but no later than December 31, 2017, or</b></li> <li>▪ Contractor must <b>notify the DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO)</b>, within 30 days of award, of ANY NIST SP 800-171 <b>security requirement that has NOT been implemented</b> at the time of contract award.</li> </ul>
<b>252.204-7009</b> (clause)	<b>Limitations on the Use or Disclosure of Third-Party Contractor Reported Cyber Incident Information.</b> <i>New Addition – Aug 26, 2015</i> <i>Revised - Dec 30, 2015</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Contractor agrees to use contractor or 3<sup>rd</sup> party information for supporting government activities and no other use.</li> <li>▪ A 3<sup>rd</sup> party reporting an incident is a 3<sup>rd</sup> party beneficiary to the Non-disclosure agreement between the Contractor and the government.</li> <li>▪ Contractor shall include this clause, including this paragraph (c), in subcontracts, or similar contractual instruments, for services that include support for the Government’s activities related to safeguarding covered defense information and cyber incident reporting, including subcontracts for commercial items, without alteration, except to identify the parties</li> </ul>



# D F A R S

SUBPART / CLAUSE	TITLE	REQUIREMENTS
<b>239.76</b> (subpart)	<b>Cloud Computing.</b> <i>New Addition – Aug 26, 2015</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ DoD will acquire cloud computing using commercial T&amp;Cs consistent with Federal Law.</li> <li>▪ Contracts will be awarded to cloud service providers that are granted provisional authorization by DISA.</li> <li>▪ Prescribes 252.239-7009 &amp; -7010</li> </ul>
<b>252.239-7009</b> (provision)	<b>Representation of Use of Cloud Computing.</b> <i>New Addition – Aug 26, 2015</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The <b>Contractor will be required to provide, as a part of its offer, a Representation of Intent to use Cloud Computing Services</b> in performance of the contract.</li> </ul>
<b>252.239-7010</b> (clause)	<b>Cloud Computing Services.</b> <i>New Addition – Aug 26, 2015</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>Representation at time of offer or written approval</b> by the contracting officer required <b>before using cloud computing.</b></li> <li>▪ Safeguards and controls to be implemented in accordance with <b>DISA Cloud Computing Security Requirements Guide (SRG)</b></li> <li>▪ Use of data for contract purposes only</li> <li>▪ Incident reporting to <a href="http://dibnet.dod.mil">http://dibnet.dod.mil</a></li> <li>▪ Notification of 3rd party request for data</li> <li>▪ Subcontractor Flow-Down required</li> </ul>

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# **FAR**

**(Federal Acquisition Regulation)**

**Subpart 4.19 Basic Safeguarding of Covered Contractor Information Systems**

**52.204-21 Basic Safeguarding of Covered Contractor Information Systems**

# NARA REQUIRES CUI IN 2016

## NARA, CUI Requirements, and the FAR Clause



Executive Order 13556, Controlled Unclassified Information, November 4, 2010, established the CUI Program and designated the National Archives and Record Administration (NARA) as its Executive Agent to implement the Order and to oversee agency actions to ensure compliance with the Order.

**Regarding contractors, the CUI Executive Agent anticipates establishing a single Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) clause in 2016 to apply the requirements of NIST Special Publication 800-171 to the contractor environment as well as to determine oversight responsibilities and requirements.**

The CUI Executive Agent also addresses its oversight of federal agencies in the proposed regulation for incorporation into the Code of Federal Regulations. Approaches to oversight will be determined through the uniform CUI FAR clause, future understandings, and any agreements between federal agencies and their nonfederal information-sharing partners.

*--Special Publication NIST 800-171, page 15.*



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27

# THE FAR 15/NIST 800-171 DIFFERENCES

**Any Federal Acquisition will FAR 52.204-21.**

**There are 15 FAR requirements that essentially are NIST 800-171 requirements with 2 exceptions:**

FAR 52.204-21 Specified Requirements	Corresponding NIST (SP) 800-171 Requirements
(vii) Sanitize or destroy information system media containing <b>Federal Contract Information</b> before disposal or release for reuse.	3.8.3 Sanitize or destroy information system media containing <b>CUI</b> before disposal or release for reuse.
(ix) Escort visitors and monitor visitor activity; maintain audit logs of physical access; and control and manage physical access devices.	3.10.3 Escort visitors and monitor visitor activity. 3.10.4 Maintain audit logs of physical access. 3.10.5 Control and manage physical access devices.

**CUI Registry** (<https://www.archives.gov/cui/registry/category-list>)

# FINAL NOTE

- Some aerospace prime contractors including Lockheed, BAE Systems, Boeing, Raytheon, and Rolls-Royce have agreed to use the cloud based solutions of EXOSTAR LLC to comply with the cyber DFARS.
- They employ two (2) ‘check the box’ questionnaires; one based on the Center for Internet Security (CIS) Top 20 Critical Security Controls (CSC) – commonly referred to as the SANS 20, and the other based on NIST 800-171
- They require a signed representation of ‘truthful statements’
- They claim they prefer a “risk management approach” rather than a “compliance” approach
- Exostar is privately held owned by Lockheed Martin, BAE Systems, Boeing, and Raytheon.

The Contractor is responsible for complying with NIST 800-171 and it should be well documented.

- The contractor signs the ‘Certs & Reps’ in each proposal submitted
- Soon the contractor will be required to submit the SSP & POA&M
- The contractor records will be examined by the government in the event of an incident
- No other standards or guidelines satisfy this requirement
- Only the government can approve alternative security controls within NIST 800-171

*Besides, the questionnaires are much easier to complete if you have done your assessment and compliance first!*

# NIST 800-171

*Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Information Systems and Organizations*

# NIST 800-171

## NIST 800-171 Security Families

AC - Access Control (3.1)	22
AT - Awareness & Training (3.2)	3
AU - Audit & Accountability (3.3)	9
CM - Configuration Management (3.4)	9
IA - Identification & Authentication (3.5)	11
IR - Incident Response (3.6)	3
MA - Maintenance (3.7)	6
MP - Media Protection (3.8)	9
PS - Personnel Security (3.9)	2
PE - Physical Protection (3.10)	6
RA - Risk Assessment (3.11)	3
CA - Security Assessment (3.12)	3 / 4
SC - System & Communications Protection (3.13)	16
SI - System & Information Integrity (3.14)	7

TOTAL REQUIREMENTS: 109  
110

## REV 1 – NIST 800-171 (Is Final)

- Guidance on the use of system **security plans (SSPs)** and **plans of action and milestones (POAMs)** to demonstrate the implementation or planned implementation of CUI requirements by nonfederal organizations;
- **Guidance on federal agency use of submitted SSPs and POAMs** as critical inputs to risk management decisions and decisions on whether or not to pursue agreements or contracts with nonfederal organizations;

3.12.4 Develop, document, periodically update, and implement system security plans for organizational information systems that describe the security requirements in place or planned for the systems.

## System Security Plan or SSP:

1. System Definition
2. Governance
3. Risk Assessment / Categorization
4. Compliance Assessment + Remediation Plan (POA&M)

# NIST 800-171 TAILORING

🕒 The Government started with the FIPS Moderate Baseline

🕒 They removed controls that ...

- ✂️ Pertained only to the government (FED)
- ✂️ Did not support “C” or Confidentiality (NCO)
- ✂️ Expected to be routinely satisfied by the non-federal organization (NFO)

TAILORING SYMBOL	TAILORING CRITERIA
NCO	NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO PROTECTING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF CUI.
FED	UNIQUELY FEDERAL, PRIMARILY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.
NFO	EXPECTED TO BE ROUTINELY SATISFIED BY NONFEDERAL ORGANIZATIONS WITHOUT SPECIFICATION.
CUI	THE CUI BASIC OR DERIVED SECURITY REQUIREMENT IS REFLECTED IN AND IS TRACEABLE TO THE SECURITY CONTROL, CONTROL ENHANCEMENT, OR SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF THE CONTROL/ENHANCEMENT.

APPENDIX E: NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-171

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# WHEN TO USE NIST 800-171

- 🕒 NIST 800-171 is intended for use by federal agencies with recommended requirements for protecting the *confidentiality* of **Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)** :
  - ✂ when the CUI is resident in **nonfederal information systems** and organizations;
  - ✂ where the CUI does not have specific safeguarding requirements prescribed by the authorizing law, regulation, or government wide policy for the CUI category or subcategory listed in the **CUI Registry** (<https://www.archives.gov/cui/registry/category-list>); and
  - ✂ when the information systems where the CUI resides are *not* operated by organizations on behalf of the federal government.
- 🕒 The requirements apply *only* to components of nonfederal information systems that process, store, or transmit CUI, or provide security protection for such components
- 🕒 Federal agencies will include CUI requirements in appropriate contractual vehicles established between those agencies and nonfederal organizations
- 🕒 Nonfederal organizations must comply with these requirements to meet contractual requirements

# MORE REQUIREMENTS?

## DFARS 252.204-7012

- Contractor (Offeror) **represents** that it will **implement security requirements** in **NIST 800-171** as soon as practical but no later than **December 31, 2017**.
- Contractor **will apply other information system security measures** when the contractor reasonably determines that [additional] security measures are required.


 There are 65 NFO controls from about all security families

 The Implementation Guides at DPAP make it clear that breaches and incidences will be investigated and the contractor will cooperate

 A solid plan with a rationale that can be defended is needed

**Do What is Right ... and Do It Right!**

## Number of Controls or Requirements per Baseline & Relative Security Score




# CYBERSECURITY MATURITY MODEL

## Maturity Indicator Level (MIL) Characteristics

### CMMI Maturity Levels

LEVEL	TITLE	CHARACTERISTICS
5	<b>Optimizing</b>	Focused on continuous process improvement
4	<b>Quantitatively Managed</b>	Process measured and controlled
3	<b>Defined</b>	Process is described & proactive
2	<b>Managed</b>	Process is described but reactive
1	<b>Initial</b>	Process not/ poorly described, reactive

Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) Institute, a subsidiary of ISACA (originally Information Systems Audit and Control Association)



**Cybersecurity Capability  
Maturity Model Version 1.1**  
DoE/DHS February 2014

# OPTIONS

## Resources

- ❖ **DHS, NIST, GOVERNMENT**
- ❖ **DIB ISAC (Defense Industrial Base, Information Sharing & Analysis Center)**
- ❖ **The i2 Cyber Compliance Center (C3 or the Cube)**

## Tools

- ❖ **Spreadsheet**
- ❖ **CSET (Cyber Security Evaluation Tool)**
- ❖ **i2ACT-800**

# ISACs & ISAOs



**DIB**  
**DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE**  
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION  
INFORMATION SHARING AND ANALYSIS CENTER

Cyber Verify™ is the DIB ISAC process for Verifying and Certifying Compliance

The DIB ISAC selected the Imprimis Compliance Tool



- 📍 National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) called for Information Sharing & Analysis Centers (ISAC) in each industrial sector (total 21)
- 📍 DoD established the DIB Cyber Security (DIB CS) Program for cleared defense contractors:
  - 📍 Operates DIBNet
- 📍 DHS is also establishing Information Sharing & Analysis Organizations (ISAO)

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# **I2 CYBER COMPLIANCE CENTER: C3 OR **'THE CUBE'****

**A Center in Colorado Springs Providing  
Compliance Support Nationally**



## **SERVICES**

- 🔗 System Definition
- 🔗 Compliance Assessment
- 🔗 Vulnerability Assessment
- 🔗 Remediation Support
- 🔗 Blue Team Preparation
- 🔗 Support Through Read Team Audit

## **FACILITIES & RESOURCES**

- 🔗 VTC/Telephonic/Remote Access
- 🔗 Training & How-to Videos
- 🔗 Policy & Plans Templates
- 🔗 Vulnerability Scanning Tools
- 🔗 Penetration Testing
- 🔗 Monitoring Services /Tools
- 🔗 Support During Incident Response

## **CONTACT INFORMATION**

**719.785.0393**

[info@i2standards.com](mailto:info@i2standards.com)

[www.i2compliancetools.com](http://www.i2compliancetools.com)

**(Support)**

# OPTION #1

## SPREADSHEET WITH WORD & FILE-SHARING

20150713-NIST 800-53-controls.xlsx - Excel

FILE HOME INSERT PAGE LAYOUT FORMULAS DATA REVIEW VIEW DEVELOPER DYMO Label ACROBAT PDF-XChange 2012

Clipboard Font Alignment Number Styles Cells Editing Mindjet

Supplemental-Guidance

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	
1	Class	Family	Number	hdra	Title	Impact	Priority	Description	Supplemental-Guidance	Enhancement 1 Impact	Enhanc
2	Technical	Access Control	AC-1		Access Control Policy and Procedures	LOW_MODERATE_HIGH	P1	The organization d	This control is intended to produce the policy and procedures that a		
3	Technical	Access Control	AC-2		Account Management	LOW_MODERATE_HIGH	P1	The organization m	The identification of authori	MODERATE_HIGH	The organ
4	Technical	Access Control	AC-3		Access Enforcement	LOW_MODERATE_HIGH	P1	The information sy	Access control policies (e.g., NONE		[ Withdra
5	Technical	Access Control	AC-4		Information Flow Enforcement	MODERATE_HIGH	P1	The information sy	Information flow control reg	NONE	The inform
6	Technical	Access Control	AC-5		Separation of Duties	MODERATE_HIGH	P1	The organization: S	Examples of separation of duties include: (i) mission functions and (		
7	Technical	Access Control	AC-6		Least Privilege	MODERATE_HIGH	P1	The organization: e	The access authorizations of	MODERATE_HIGH	The organ
8	Technical	Access Control	AC-7		Unsuccessful Login Attempts	LOW_MODERATE_HIGH	P2	The information sy	Due to the potential for deni	NONE	The inform
9	Technical	Access Control	AC-8		System Use Notification	LOW_MODERATE_HIGH	P1	The information sy	System use notification messages can be implemented in the form		
10	Technical	Access Control	AC-9		Previous Logon (Access) Notification	NONE	P0	The information sy	This control is intended to cc	NONE	The inform
11	Technical	Access Control	AC-10		Concurrent Session Control	HIGH	P2	The information sy	The organization may define the maximum number of concurrent se		
12	Technical	Access Control	AC-11		Session Lock	MODERATE_HIGH	P3	The information sy	A session lock is a temporary	NONE	The inform
13	Technical	Access Control	AC-12		Session Termination	NONE			[ Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-10 ].		
14	Technical	Access Control	AC-13		Supervision and Review Access Contr	NONE			[ Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-2 and AU-6 ].		
15	Technical	Access Control	AC-14		Permitted Actions Without Identifica	LOW_MODERATE_HIGH	P1	The organization: l	This control is intended for t	MODERATE_HIGH	The organ
16	Technical	Access Control	AC-15		Automated Marking	NONE			[ Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-3 ].		
17	Technical	Access Control	AC-16		Security Attributes	NONE	P0	The information sy	Security attributes are abstra	NONE	The inform
18	Technical	Access Control	AC-17		Remote Access	LOW_MODERATE_HIGH	P1	The organization: D	This control requires explicit	MODERATE_HIGH	The organ
19	Technical	Access Control	AC-18		Wireless Access	LOW_MODERATE_HIGH	P1	The organization: E	Wireless technologies includ	MODERATE_HIGH	The inform
20	Technical	Access Control	AC-19		Access Control for Mobile Devices	LOW_MODERATE_HIGH	P1	The organization: E	Mobile devices include port	MODERATE_HIGH	The organ
21	Technical	Access Control	AC-20		Use of External Information Systems	LOW_MODERATE_HIGH	P1	The organization: e	External information system	MODERATE_HIGH	The organ
22	Technical	Access Control	AC-21		User-based Collaboration and Inform	NONE	P0	The organization: F	The control applies to inform	NONE	The inform
23	Technical	Access Control	AC-22		Publicly Accessible Content	LOW_MODERATE_HIGH	P2	The organization: D	Nonpublic information is any information for which the general pub		
24	Operational	Awareness and Tr	AT-1		Security Awareness and Training Poli	LOW_MODERATE_HIGH	P1	The organization: d	This control is intended to produce the policy and procedures that a		
25	Operational	Awareness and Tr	AT-2		Security Awareness	LOW_MODERATE_HIGH	P1	The organization: o	The organization determine	NONE	The organ

20150713-NIST 800-53 CONTROLS

READY



# Option #2

# DHS CSET

With Spreadsheet, Word & file-sharing

Untitled Assessment 2.cset

CSET Home Information Standards SAL Diagram Requirements Analysis Reports

Standards Instructions

Selection Mode:  
 Questions  
 Requirements  
 Cybersecurity Framework

## Requirements

Select a standard from the items below:

**Chemical, Oil, and Natural Gas:**

- CFATS Risk-Based Performance Standards Guide 8-Cyber
- INGAA Control Systems Cyber Security Guidelines for the Natural Gas Pipeline Industry
- TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines April 2011

**Electrical:**

- NERC CIP-002 through CIP-009 Rev 3
- NERC CIP-002 through CIP-009 Rev 4
- NERC CIP-002 through CIP-011 Rev 5
- NISTIR 7628 Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security: Vol. 1
- NISTIR 7628 Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security: Vol. 1 Rev 1

**Information Technology:**

- NIST Special Publication 800-53 Rev 3
- NIST Special Publication 800-53 Rev 4
- NIST Special Publication 800-53 Rev 4 App J

**Process Control and SCADA:**

- NIST Special Publication 800-53 Rev 3 App I
- NIST Special Publication 800-82
- NIST Special Publication 800-82 Rev 1
- NIST Special Publication 800-82 Rev 2

**Supply Chain:**

- NIST SP800-161 Supply Chain Risk Management

**Nuclear:**

- NEI 08-09 Cyber Security Plan for Nuclear Power Reactors
- NRC Regulatory Guide 5.71

**DoDI and CNSSI:**

- DoD Instruction 8510.01
- DoD Instruction 8500.2
- CNSSI No. 1253 Baseline V2 March 27, 2014

**General:**

- Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2)
- Consensus Audit Guidelines (CAG)
- Catalog of Recommendations Rev 7

**Questions Only:**

- Key Questions
- Universal Questions

**Option  
#3**

**i2ACT-  
800**



DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE  
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION  
INFORMATION SHARING AND ANALYSIS CENTER



**IMPRIMIS ACT-  
Assessment &  
Compliance Tool**



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# i2ACT ARCHITECTURE & CONFIGURATION

## BACK END DATABASE




- User Data

- TAB: Supplemental Guidance (NIST)
- TAB: Questionnaires
- TAB: Intent & Evidence
- TAB: How to Assess & Comply
- TAB: Remediation Plan & POA&M

## FRONT END DATABASE




- User Interface
- Standards Database
- Queries
- Reports
- Baselines



## COLLABORATION

Up to 20 people may work simultaneously

# THE I2ACT SUPPORT SUITE



# SUMMARY

# (CYBER) DOGS THAT WON'T HUNT

- 🐕 I'm a small company, no one is interested in what we do ...
- 🐕 I've got plenty of time – I'll do it next year ...
- 🐕 No one is going to check so I'll just fake it ...
- 🐕 I'm a small business, I don't need to be smart on cybersecurity ...
- 🐕 I went to the cloud so they do my cybersecurity ...
- 🐕 If the government get's hacked, they should not hold me to a standard ...
- 🐕 I am a small business, I can't afford cybersecurity ...

NEW TERM:

**CYBER ANTIBODIES** – They kill or push the bad cells (systems) out ...

# SUMMARY & KEY TAKE-AWAYS

- The threat from the cyber domain is very, very real and it is ***our responsibility*** to deal with combatting this threat and managing the risk
- The need for cyber compliance is here ***now – today*** – and the Government Requirements are only going to grow, e.g. DFARS, FAR, CUI, etc.
- 🕒 Baseline standards are required for classified and unclassified systems
- 🕒 The DSS AAPM is the new standard for system accreditation or authorization
- 🕒 NIST (SP) 800-171 is the minimum baseline standard for unclassified systems in contractor facilities
- The lack of provable cyber security compliance, represents a ***real and present danger to small businesses***
- Resources and tools exist to support the compliance process, and these tools will get better with time and with use

**... This is Doable, You Can Make This Happen!!!!**

# IMPRIMIS, INC.

FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

<http://www.i2ComplianceTools.com>

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